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fuel additives in gasoline, including oxygenates, which 
increase the oxygen content of fuels. Congress included 
the oxygenate provisions to placate special interests, 
particularly the ethanol lobby.8 Adding oxygenates to 
fuel increases the price of gasoline but does not do much 
to help clean the air. In some cases, oxygenates can 
reduce emissions of one pollutant at the expense of 
increasing another. Worse, the most widely used 
oxygenate, methyl tertiary butyl ether ("MTBE") has been 
linked to widespread water contamination.9 In the state 
of Michigan alone, some 500 wells are contaminated with 
MTBE.10 This is hardly the only time the CAA has 
produced perverse environmental results. Provisions in 
the 1977 legislative amendments, for example, were 
designed to benefit regional coal producers at the 
expense of their competitors, and air quality suffered as a 
result.11 
• Enacted in 1973, the Endangered Species Act ("ESA")12 
was supposed to bring species back from the brink of 
extinction. Yet in nearly thirty years, fewer than thirty of 
over 1,000 domestic species have been taken off the 
endangered and threatened species lists. Of these, more 
have been delisted by reason of extinction than because 
of recovery due to the ESA's protections.13 One problem 
is that regulatory protection for endangered species 
8. For all the gory details of how the oxygenate provisions became law, see 
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: 
PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael Greve & Fred Smith eds., 1992) 
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS]. 
9. See Ben Lieberman, Running on MTBE: Closing the Pumps on the Oxygen Content 
Requirement, CEI ONPOINT No. 50, available at http:/ /www.cei.org/ 
OnPointReader.asp?ID=833 (Oct. 29, 1999). 
10. See David Mastio, Legal, Scientific Attacks Hobble EPA, DETROIT NEWS, May 8, 
2000, at A1. 
11. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL, DIRTY AIR 
(1981). 
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2000). 
13. See Robert E. Gordon, Jr., James K. Lacey & James R. Streeter, Conservation 
Under the Endangered Species Act, 23 ENV'T INT'L 359 (1997); see also Ike C. Sugg, 
Caught in the Act: Evaluating the Endangered Species Act, Its Effects on Man and 
Prospects for Reform, 24 CUMB. L. REV. 1, 42-44 (1993). It is worth noting that many 
of the alleged "successes" of the ESA are nothing of the kind and involve species 
that were either never in danger of extinction or were helped by exogenous 
factors. See id. (discussing the examples of the Palau dove, Palau fantail flycatcher, 
Palau owl, Rydberg milk-vetch, and American alligator). 
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discourages habitat conservation on private land. 
land-use restrictions make ownership of 
endangered species habitats a liability instead of an asset. 
The presence of a listed species can freeze the use of 
private land, barring everything from home construction 
and timber cutting to farming and clearing firebreaks. 
Faced with this risk, landowners respond accordingly. 
Indeed, there is increasing evidence that landowners 
preemptively destroy potential habitat rather than risk 
federal regulation.14 
These are but a few examples of the harms caused by 
existing environmental programs, each of which costs the 
American people billions of dollars per year. Taken as a whole, 
today' s environmental regulations impose substantial costs and 
inequitable burdens, generate meager benefits, and divert 
resources from environmental efforts that could produce more 
significant gains. 
This Article seeks to outline an alternative approach to 
environmental policy, one based on market institutions and 
property rights instead of central planning and bureaucratic 
control. In principle, this entails nothing less than a complete 
reorientation of existing environmental policy. The aim is both 
to improve environmental protection and to lessen the costs-
economic and otherwise. It seeks to enhance environmental 
protection without sacrificing individual rights or economic 
liberty, to safeguard environmental values without expanding 
government control of Americans' lives, and to find solutions 
grounded in market institutions, not regulatory bureaucracies. 
Part II of this Article diagnoses the problem with 
conventional approaches to environmental policy. It is not 
merely that existing regulations and programs are inefficient or 
overly bureaucratic. Rather, the failure of existing 
environmental strategies is the inevitable result of an outlook 
that views government regulation as the proper policy 
response to each and every activity that produces an 
environmental impact. This approach to environmental policy 
is a recipe for ecological central planning and is destined to fail. 
14. See Dean Lueck, The Law and Politics of Federal Wildlife Preservation, in 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN 107-10 (Terry 
L. Anderson ed., 2000) [hereinafter POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM]; Sugg, supra 
note 13, at 43. 
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Part III provides a cursory outline of an alternative paradigm 
for environmental protection that is grounded in market 
institutions, particularly property rights. This vision is often 
referred to as "free market environmentalism." By focusing on 
institutions and the incentives that they create, this approach to 
environmental policy seeks to reconcile human demands 
economic well-being, safety, and environmental protection by 
incorporating environmental resources and values into the 
marketplace, rather than regulating them outside economic 
institutions. 
A new science of environmental protection will not, indeed 
cannot, be implemented overnight. Political and institutional 
change is necessarily incremental. With this in mind, Part IV 
outlines a series of principles that should guide those interested 
in a more efficient, effective, and equitable approach to 
environmental protection, and offers specific examples of 
policy reforms that can reconcile environmental protection and 
market institutions. 
II. DIAGNOSING THE PROBLEM 
A. The Call for Change 
Environmental regulation imposes a large and growing 
burden on the United States economy. In 1999, environmental 
regulations cost an estimated $206 billion- over one-quarter of 
the total federal regulatory burden.15 These costs are rarely 
readily apparent; rather, they are buried in the costs of 
products and services throughout the economy. Apparent or 
not, the pinch is real- over $2,000 for the average family of 
four in 1999.16 These numbers will only increase in the years to · 
come. In late 1999, the EPA's accounted for over ten percent of 
all new rules in the regulatory pipeline.17 Of 137 
forthcoming major rules identified by the federal government 
in October 1999, the EPA accounted for twenty-eight, over 
twenty percent of the total, and more than any other federal 
15. See CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL 
POLICYMAKER'S SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 4 fig.3 (3d ed. 
2000) (figure in 1998 dollars). 
16. See id. 
17. See id. at 17 fig.13. 
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agency.18 
Environmental regulations are certainly costly. The relevant 
question is whether they produce much in return. After all, if 
the benefits outweigh the costs, it may not be worth quibbling 
over the price tag. The EPA claims that many pf its rules 
represent cost-effective approaches to pressing environmental 
concerns, but critics suggest otherwise.19 Assessing the record 
is difficult due to the lack of consistent reporting by regulatory 
agencies of regulatory costs and benefits.20 Moreover, it is 
difficult- if not impossible- to account accurately for the value 
of environmental protection, particularly in the context of 
unowned, i.e., "public," resources.21 
There is no question that the early environmental laws 
seemed to work well.22 Beginning in the 1960s, many indicators 
of environmental quality showed distinct improvement.23 Some 
of these gains were likely due to the first generation of federal 
environmental regulation. The rest occurred due to state and 
local efforts or other extraneous factors. 24 The initial generation 
18. See id. at 19 fig.15. "Major" rules are the most significant regulations-those 
that are estimated to cost over $100 million annually and classified as 
"economically significant." !d. at 18-19. 
19. See generally, e.g., Robert W. Crandall, Frederick H. Reuter & William A. 
Steger, Clearing the Air: EPA 's Self-Assessment of Clean Air Policy, REG., Vol. 19, 
No.4, at 35 (1996) (critiquing the EPA's retrospective study of costs and benefits 
under the CAA); Craig S. Marxsen, The Environmental Propaganda Agency, IND. 
REV., Vol. V, No.1 (2000) (same). 
20. See CREWS, supra note 15, at 32-34; Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing 
Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 
12,866, 23 HARV. J .L. & PUB. POL'Y 859, 865-77 (2000). 
21. See, e.g., Donald J. Boudreaux, Roger E. Meiners & Todd J. Zywicki, Talk Is 
Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 29 ENVTL. L. 765 (1999). 
22. The record, however, is clearly mixed. For instance, "none of the available 
data" are able to demonstrate that water quality nationwide is demonstrably 
better than it would have been absent the Clean Water Act. A. Myrick Freeman III, 
Water Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 97, 
114 (Paul Portney ed., 1990); see also Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Clean 
Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY 
73,86-87 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1993). 
23. See generally, e.g., BORIS DEWEIL, STEVEN HAYWARD, LAURA JONES & M. 
DANIELLE SMITH, INDEX OF LEADING ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS FOR THE U.S. 
AND CANADA (1997) (documenting improvement in many environmental 
indicators over the past several decades). 
24. For example, available air quality data indicates that emissions of at least 
some air pollutants declined more rapidly before the onset of federal air quality 
regulation. This case is made quite extensively in INDUR GOKLANY, CLEARING THE 
AIR (1999). Goklany discusses EPA data showing particulate emission reductions 
to be significantly greater in the 1960s than after the CAA took affect. "These data 
also call into question one of the fundamental premises behind the [CAA]: that 
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of environmental policy was effective principally because it 
was plucking low-hanging fruit; removing lead from gasoline 
and preventing the disposal of raw sewage in rivers were 
relatively easy issues to address. Environmental problems were 
obvious and economical policy measures were readily 
available. Not so any more. 
Today few low-hanging fruit remain, and the existing 
regulatory system is ill-equipped, if not constitutionally unable, 
to reach any higher.25 As regulations tighten, they yield· 
diminishing marginal returns. In 1997, the EPA proposed a 
further tightening of national ambient air quality standards for 
ozone ("smog") and particulate matter ("soot"). Independent 
analysts estimated the new rules could cost as much as $90 to 
$150 billion per year to implement.26 By the EPA's own 
estimates, the costs of the new ozone standard would exceed 
the benefits.Z7 One reason is that all of the relatively 
inexpensive control measures have been adopted. For example, 
under current federal regulations, a new car produced in 2000 
emits over 90 percent fewer emissions than a car produced just 
a few decades ago.28 There is not much more to be gained by 
tightening these standards even further. 
Continuing to press for further incremental gains is 
increasingly expensive and, in some cases, results in net 
environmental harm.29 For instance, when reviewing the EPA's 
states and local governments never would impose the controls necessary to 
achieve healthful air." Paul Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBUC POUCIES FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 98 (Paul Portney ed., 2d ed. 2000). 
25. For a discussion of some of the constitutional limits to federal environmental 
regulation, see Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green Aspects of Printz: The 
Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L. 
REV. 573 (1998) (outlining the potential impact of Printz v. United States and other 
federalism decisions on federal environmental regulation). 
26 .. See ANNE E. SMITH ET AL., COSTS, ECONOMIC IMPACTS, AND BENEFITS OF 
EPA'S OZONE AND PARTICULATE STANDARDS (Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy 
Study No. 226, 1997). 
27. See U.S. EPA Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards Innovative 
Strategies and Economics Group, Regulatory Impact Analysis for Proposed Ozone 
National Ambient Air Quality Standard (Research Triangle Park, N.C., December 
1996); see also Susan E. Dudley & Wendy L. Gramm, EPA's Ozone Standard May 
Harm Public Health and Welfare, 17 RISK ANALYSIS 403 (1997). 
28. See K.H. Jones & Jonathan Adler, Time to Reopen the Clean Air Act: Clearing 
Away the Regulatory Smog, POLICY ANALYSIS NO. 233, tbl.7 (Cato Institute, 1995), 
available at http:/ /www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-233.html. 
29. See generally David Mastio, EPA Adapts to New Environmental Challenges, 
DETROIT NEWS, May 9, 2000, at A1 (reporting observation of Paul Portney, 
President of Resources for the Future, that "[a]s the agency attacks smaller 
problems, the danger is that some of the consequences of environmental 
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proposed revisions to national air quality standards, the Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that the EPA ignored 
evidence that further tightening the ozone standard could have 
negative impacts on public health.30 Today' s hyper-stringent 
environmental regulations are themselves substantial barriers 
to ecological conservation and pollution reduction in many 
sectors of the economy. Newer technologies are often subject to 
more stringent environmental regulations despite their 
potential to reduce environmental impacts. As the Clinton 
Administration noted in its report Reinventing Environmental 
Regulation: "Prescriptive regulations can be inflexible, resulting 
in costly actions that defy common sense by requiring greater 
costs for smaller returns. This approach can discourage 
technological innovation that can lower the costs of regulation 
or achieve environmental benefits beyond compliance."31 
These problems in environmental policy have gradually 
produced a consensus on the need for significant reform. With 
few exceptions, environmental analysts recognize that changes 
must be made in order for environmental gains to continue into 
the twenty-first century. "The EPA's programs need some 
major rethinking, and they're not getting it," observes Terry 
Davies of Resources for the Future.32 According to the United 
States Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 
"federal rules and procedures governing decisionmaking for 
protecting the environment often are complex, conflicting, 
diffiCult to apply, adversarial, costly, inflexible, and 
uncertain."33 Analysts at the Progressive Policy Institute, a 
think tank affiliated with the Democratic Leadership Council, 
protection will be as bad or worse than the original problem we were trying to 
solve"). 
30. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1999), aff'd 
in part, rev'd in part, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001). 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA's refusal to consider 
the radiation-blocking potential of tropospheric ozone violated the Clean Air Act. 
Id. at 1051-53; see also Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-B Screening by 
Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the National Ambient Air Quality Standard, 31 
ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 142A, 145A (1997) (documenting likely rise in UV-B exposure 
due to reductions in tropospheric ozone). 
31. William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Reinventing Environmental Regulation, 
NAT'L PERFORMANCE REV., Mar. 1995, at 2. 
32. Mastio, supra note 10. 
33. U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, A-122, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL DECISIONMAKING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND 
PUBLIC WORKS 1 (1992), cited in Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: 
Historical Roots and Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141, 1165 (1995). 
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note that existing environmental regulations "are increasingly 
inefficient in a fast-paced economy and too rigid" to address 
modern environmental concerns.34 "The current system, 
consisting mainly of end-of-pipe, technology-based 
regulations, is inadequate for the challenges ahead," observes 
Karl Hausker who oversaw the Enterprise for the Environment 
project, an effort to develop a consensus on environmental 
reform.35 Most analysts agree on the need for change, if not on 
the kinds of change required. 
B. The Failure of Central Ecological Planning 
Conventional environmental policymaking presupposes that 
only government action can improve environmental quality. In 
this view, environmental problems arise from "market failures" 
that produce "externalities." Governmentregulation is needed 
to correct environmental concerns that the market has failed to 
handle because they are "external" to the price signals that 
regulate marketplace transactions. To say that the market has 
failed simply means that human activity has generated an 
environmental impact that is not accounted for in the price of 
that activity. Thus, the conventional paradigm of 
environmental policy justifies the regulation of all activities-
from driving a car to turning on a light bulb- that have an 
impact on the environment that is not factored into the cost of 
the product or service. Economic central planning may be 
intellectually and historically discredited, but the "market 
failure" thesis justifies environmental regulatory control of just 
about everything. As a result, current regulations tell 
landowners where they can build a home or plant a garden and 
instruct businesses on how best to manufacture goods and 
handle byproducts. Indeed, the federal government has passed 
environmental regulations governing everything from the 
chemical composition of gasoline36 to the design of home 
34. Debra S. Knopman & Marc K. Landy, A New Model of Governance, 
BLUEPRINT, Fall 2000, available at http:/ fwww.ppionline.org/ndol (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2001). 
35. Karl Hausker, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Only Path to a 
Sustainable Future, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10148, 10148 (1999). 
36. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (2000) (directing the EPA to "promulgate 
regulations under this section establishing requirements for reformulated gasoline 
to be used in gasoline-f1;1eled vehicles in specified nonattainment areas"). 
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appliances, including washing machines and toilets.37 As 
environmental analyst Richard Stewart observed, "the system 
has grown to the point where it amounts to nothing less than a 
massive effort at Soviet-style planning of the economy to 
achieve environmental goals."38 
The dilemma for policy makers is that ecological central 
planning cannot succeed any better than its economic cousin. 
Indeed, the likelihood of long-term success is even less in the 
environmental context; planning the "production" of air quality 
or other ecological "goods" is orders of magnitude more 
complex· than planning the production of shoes or wheat. 
Centralized regulatory agencies are ill-equipped to handle the 
myriad ecological interactions triggered or impacted by private 
activity. No doubt the first generation of environmental 
regulations produced some significant gains-just as the Soviet 
economies once appeared productive.39 Over time, however, 
every centrally planned economy collapsed under its own 
weight. As centralized environmental regulations reach their 
limit, they too begin to falter. 
In the Soviet system, further gains in production were 
achieved for a time through the reliance upon tradable quotas 
and other efforts to design a IJ'market socialist" system.40 Similar 
proposals are forwarded today to add market incentives to the 
existing regulatory infrastructure. Nonetheless, most 
environmental analysts recognize that federal regulatory 
policies are too costly and ineffective and cannot be relied upon 
into the future.41 The problem is not merely one of regulatory 
design; it lies at the core of the current environmental 
37. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. 102-486, § 123, 106 Stat. 2817, 2817-32 
(1992) (setting water efficiency standards for toilets); see also Energy Conservation 
Program for Consumer Products: Clothes Washer Energy Conservation 
Standards, 65 Fed. Reg. 59,550-01 (2000) (to be codified at 10 C.P.R. pt. 430) (notice 
of proposed rulemaking on water efficiency standards for washing machines). 
38. Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic 
Incentives, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 153, 154 (1988). 
39. Some, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, were celebrating the alleged success 
of the Soviet economic system into the 1980s. See, e.g., John Kenneth Galbraith, 
Reflections: A Visit to Russia, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 3, 1984, at 54, 65 (claiming that 
"the Russian system succeeds because in contrast to the Western industrial 
economy it makes full use of its manpower"). 
40. See Paul Georgia, Owning the Unownable, in ECOLOGY, LIBERTY & PROPERTY: 
A FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTAL REAOER Gonathan H. Adler ed., 2000). 
41. See, e.g., Hausker, supra note 35, at 10148 (arguing that environmental 
regulation must be reinvented to ensure sustainability). 
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approach. 
Under the conventional approach to environmental policy, 
federal regulators who are located in or at least are responsible 
to Washington identify the greatest environmental concerns for 
the nation as a whole. Next they must identify the causes of 
these problems, and the proper solutions. Regulatory strictures 
must be designed to account for the myriad differences 
between industries, communities, and ecosystems. Monitoring 
and compliance systems must be developed to ensure that 
standards are met and dictates are obeyed. Because the federal 
government itself cannot be trusted; additional measures are 
necessary, including strict legislative deadlines, private "citizen 
suit" provisions that can force the government's hand, and 
"parallel" liability systems to impose additional costs upon 
noncompliant firms.42 It does not end there. As circumstances 
change, the whole system must be revised to take into account 
new factors by incorporating new environmental threats into 
the system without forgetting to address the old. 
Such a system cannot work because each and every step 
requires more information than can be realistically gathered or 
processed. Environmental problems are not uniform, nor are 
their solutions. The carrying capacity of a given pasture or 
stream or the vulnerability of a given ecosystem to disruption 
changes with time and place. One river may suffer from 
excessive nutrient loads, another from a deficiency. Smog in 
one city may be due to exorbitant levels of nitrogen oxide 
("NOx"); in another, NOx controls may actually increase smog 
formation.43 As a result, centralized environmental regulation 
is inherently limited by "the inability of central planners to 
gather and process the information needed to write directives 
appropriately responsive to the diverse and changing 
conditions of different economic actors; and the failure of 
central planning commands to provide the necessary incentives 
and flexibility for environmentally and economically beneficial 
innovation."44 
42. Richard B. Stewart, United States Environmental Regulation: A Failing 
Paradigm, 15 J.L. & COM. 585, 586-87 (1996). 
43. This is because smog formation is largely determined by the ratio of NOx to 
hydrocarbons in the ambient air. Meteorlogical conditions can also play a 
substantial role. 
44. Stewart, supra note 42, at 587. 
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Governmental institutions are also heavily resistant to 
change. Legislatures struggle to reach consensus, and 
bureaucratic agencies burrow into ruts that keep them on 
courses long past their usefulness. 45 Indeed, programs can 
survive long after it is demonstrated that they cause more harm 
than good. The world has changed dramatically in the past 
three decades, and yet the environmental regulatory 
framework in place in 2000 is much the same as it was in 1970. 
Most of the changes have merely been the addition of levels to 
the administrative layer cake rather than reinventions or 
reorientations of programs and initiatives. 
For many years political scientists held out the hope that 
"scientific management" by the best and brightest could 
address environmental concerns.46 It was postulated that well-
intentioned experts could succeed where markets failed. No 
such luck. "If qualified managers with good intentions were 
sufficient to ensure sound decisionmaking, Yellowstone would 
be the Eden of the national parks."47 Instead, Yellowstone 
National Park is grossly mismanaged-"[r]ather than 
preserved, it is being destroyed."48 Public management, or 
rather political management, is failing. No matter how well-
intentioned the public official, the incentives she faces run 
contrary to sound resource management.49 If a forest manager 
improves management or saves money on timber sales, she 
risks a smaller appropriation in the next Congress. If a park 
ranger solves an ecological problem in a National Park, she 
risks losing resources to more "urgent" problems. 
In his landmark study of bureaucracy, James Q. Wilson 
observed that "[t]here is a kind of Gresham's law at work in 
45. LUDWIG VON MISES, LIBERALISM IN THE CLASSICAL TRADITION, 102 (3d. ed. 
1985) ("[B]ureaucratic management in any case continues to suffer from the 
unwieldiness and the lack of ability to adjust itself to changing conditions that 
have everywhere led public enterprises from one failure to another."). 
46. See generally ROBERT H. NELSON, PUBLIC LANDS AND PRIVATE RIGHTS (1995) 
(documenting the development and eventual failure of "scientific management" of 
federal lands). 
47. Michael Copeland, The New Resource Economics, in THE YELLOWSTONE 
PRIMER 13 Gohn A. Baden & Donald Leal eds., 1990). 
48. ALSTON CHASE, PLAYING GOD IN YELLOWSTONE 6 (1987). For a similar 
indictment of federal management of Rocky Mountain National Park, see 
generally KARL HESS, ROCKY TIMES AT ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK (1993). 
49. See VON MISES, supra note 45, at 102 ("[M]anagers, as functionaries of the 
state, do not have the personal interest in the success or failure of the business that 
is characteristic of the management of private enterprises."). 
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many government bureaus: Work that produces measurable 
outcomes tends to drive out work that produces unmeasurable 
outcomes."50 On federal lands, this means that things like 
dollars spent, road-miles built or- in days gone by-- acres cut 
displaces a focus on the health of the land and ecological 
values. Similarly, in the EPA's Office of Enforcement and 
Compliance Assurance, the number of criminal convictions and 
amount of fines issued are more important than the actual 
amount of cleanup achieved. 51 
Given the incentives faced by bureaucracies, high profile 
actions tend to drive out less flashy, but arguably more 
important measures. Thus, a President can burnish his 
environmental credentials by unilaterally ordering National 
Monument designations while federal lands languish due to 
shortfalls in budgets for maintenance and other routine 
expenditures. The Secretary of the Interior can grab the front 
page by announcing measures to protect the bald eagle or some 
other charismatic megafauna, while less attractive but no less 
important species receive little support.52 Put another way, 
"bureaucrats also tend to favor programs with visible benefits 
and invisible costs."53 This can make for good politics, but it 
does not advance environmental protection. 
If public sector management places environmental resources 
at the mercy of public sector employees and the incentives they 
face, it also makes such resources vulnerable to special interest 
groups that seek to use government power to their advantage. 
Attempts "to gain a competitive advantage through 
manipulation of the regulatory process" are "occurring with 
increasing frequency," according to former Environmental 
Protection Agency Deputy Administrator A. James Barnes.54 
This inefficient interference by special interests, known as 
50. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 155 (1989). 
51. See Jonathan H. Adler, Bean Counting for a Better Earth: Environmental 
Enforcement at the EPA, REG., Spring 1998, at 40-48. 
52. See Don Coursey, The Revealed Demand for a Public Good: Evidence from 
Endangered and Threatened Species, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 411 (1998) (noting wide 
disparity in money spent to recover different endangered species). 
53. Copeland, supra note 47, at 17-18; see also Terry L. Anderson, The New 
Resource Economics: Old Ideas and New Applications, AM. J. AGRIC. ECON., Dec. 1982, 
at 929. 
54. A. James Barnes, How to Milk EPA's Smog Rules for Fun and Profit, SAC. BEE, 
Mar. 30,1994, at B7. 
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"rent-seeking," is facilitated by the fact that firms have the 
ability to receive concentrated benefits through government 
action, whereas the costs are dispersed throughout the whole. 
of society.55 In the regulatory context, rent-seeking typically 
consists of pursuing those government interventions that will 
provide comparative advantage to a particular industry or 
subsector. By restricting entry or reducing output, regulations 
can serve to reduce competition and cartelize an industry and 
potentially increase returns. 
Rent-seeking has become rather pervasive in regulatory 
programs- provisions that benefit specific politically 
influential interests are relatively easy to hide from public 
scrutiny in the Code of Federal Regulations. Environmental 
regulation is a particularly attractive venue for rent-seeking 
because environmental protection is so popular.56 Special 
interest policies become more politically palatable when given 
a green veneer. In other cases, existing regulations are tweaked 
to advantage one firm or industry over another. Yet as 
environmental policies get manipulated to serve narrow 
interests, their ability to meet environmental goals is 
compromised, if not sacrificed altogether. To take one 
prominent example, the EPA proposed changes to the 
reformulated gasoline program in 1994 to increase the use of 
/Frenewable" fuel sources by mandating that a minimum 
percentage of oxygen-enhancing fuel additives from ethanol or 
ethanol-derived sources. This rule would have done nothing to 
improve environmental quality. Indeed, the EPA "even 
conceded that use of ethanol might possibly make air quality 
worse."57 The EPA knew the problems with the rule, but 
55. See generally Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political 
Externalities: The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. 
L. REV. 845 (1999) (describing the phenomenon of rent-seeking in environmental 
policy). 
56. See C. Ford Runge, Trade Protectionism and Environmental Regulations: The 
New Nontariff Barriers, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 47, 47 (1990) ("Because 
environmental standards have a growing national constituency, they are 
especially attractive candidates for disguised protectionism."); see also Robert E. 
McCormick, A Review of the Economics of Regulation: The Political Process, in 
REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 27-28 (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1989) ("There is abundant 
evidence in the economics literature that when the flag of public interest is raised 
to support regulation, there is always a private interest lurking in the 
background."). 
57. 59 Fed. Reg. 39,268 (1994), cited in Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 52 F.3d 1113, 
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pushed ahead anyway. Why? Because the ethanol lobby would 
benefit.58 Unfortunately, this is hardly an isolated example.59 
Worse, as the pages in the Federal Register devoted to 
environmental· regulation proliferate, so will the opportunities 
and incentives for rent-seeking. 
III. PROPERTY -BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 
THE FREE MARKET ALTERNATIVE 
The problem with the dominant approach to environmental 
policy is its reliance upon centralized political mechanisms. The 
limitations of such mechanisms- whether regulations, fiscal 
instruments, or direct management of environmental 
resources- hamper the effectiveness of existing environmental 
programs. As environmental problems become ever more 
complex, these limitations will only become more severe. The 
answer is not greater government control or manipulation of 
the marketplace, but a greater reliance upon property rights 
and voluntary arrangements. By encouraging a more efficient 
use of resources, responsible stewardship, and technological 
innovation, property rights in environmental resources provide 
a sounder foundation for the advancement of environmental 
values than the modern regulatory state. 
Property-based environmental protection- commonly 
referred to as "free market environmentalism"60 or "FME"-
rejects the "market failure" model. "Rather than viewing the 
world in terms of market failure, we should view the problem 
of externalities as a failure to permit markets and create markets 
where they do not yet-or no longer-exist."61 Where 
1119 (1995) (invalidating EPA-reformulated gasoline regulations due to lack of 
statutory authority). 
58. See John Dillin, EPA Stirs Debate on Benefits of Ethanol Fuel Additive, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 30, 1994, at 1 (reporting on EPA Administrator 
Carol Browner's and Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy's explicit acknowledgment 
that the rule was issued in part to assuage the concerns of the ethanol industry). 
See generally Adler, supra note 8 (providing a history of thereformulated gasoline 
program and the pervasive role of the special interest politics in it). 
59. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, supra note 8 (documenting 
examples of rent-seeking in environmental policy); POLffiCAL 
ENVIRONMENTALISM, supra note 14 (same); Zywicki, supra note 55 (same). 
60. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTALISM (1991). For additional formulations of free-market 
environmentalism, see ECOLOGY, LIBERTY & PROPERTY: A FREE MARKET 
ENVIRONMENTAL READER Oonathan H. Adler ed., 2000); BRUCE YANDLE, COMMON 
SENSE AND COMMON LAW FOR THE ENVIRONMENT (1997). 
61. Fred L. Smith, Jr., Conclusion: Environmental Policy at the Crossroads, in 
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environmental problems are most severe it is typically a lack of 
markets, in particular a lack of enforceable and exchangeable 
property rights, that is to blame. Resources that are privately 
owned or managed and therefore are incorporated into market 
institutions are typically well-maintained. Environmental 
problems, therefore, are "essentially property rights problems" 
which are solved by the extension, definition, and defense of 
property rights in environmental resources. 62 
Resources that are unowned or politically controlled, on the 
other hand, are more apt to be inadequately managed. In his 
seminal essay on the "tragedy of the commons,"63 Garrett 
Hardin gave an illustration of this principle, stating that there 
is no incentive for any individual to protect the commonly 
owned grazing pasture in a rural village. Indeed, it is in every 
shepherd's self-interest to have his herd overgraze the pasture 
and before any other herd. Every shepherd who acquires 
additional livestock gains the benefits of a larger herd, while 
the cost of overusing the pasture is spread across all members 
of the village. The benefits of increased use are concentrated, 
while the costs are dispersed. Inevitably, the consequence is an 
overgrazed pasture, and everyone loses. The shepherd with 
foresight, who anticipates that the pasture will become barren 
in the future, will not exercise forbearance. Quite the opposite: 
he will have the added incentive to overgraze now to capture 
gains that otherwise would be lost. Refusing to add another 
animal to one's own herd does not change the incentive of 
every other shepherd to do so. 
The world's fisheries offer a contemporary example of the 
tragedy of the commons. Because oceans are unowned, no 
fishing fleet has an incentive to conserve or replenish the fish it 
takes, but each has every incentive to take as many fish as 
possible lest the benefits of a larger catch go to someone else.64 
Efforts to control access through prescriptive regulations do 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS, supra note 8, at 192. 
62. Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners, Property Rights and Externalities: Problems 
and Solutions, in WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? xi (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. 
Meiners eds., 1998); see also ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 60, at 3 (stating that 
"[a]t the heart of free market environmentalism is a system of well-specified 
property rights to natural resources"). 
63. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 168 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
64. See MICHAEL DE ALESSI, FISHING FOR SOLUTIONS 14 (lEA Environment Unit 
1998). 
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relatively little to change this equation.65 Shorten the fishing 
season, and the fishing merely becomes more intense. Limit the 
use of certain gear, and fishennen will simply employ more 
hands to maximize the catch. Private ownership overcomes the 
commons problem because owners can prevent overuse by 
controlling access to the resource. As Hardin noted, "The 
tragedy of the commons as a food basket is averted by private 
property, or something formally like it."66 In the case of 
fisheries, the creation of property rights, whether in fisheries 
themselves or portions of a given catch, promotes sustainable 
fishing practices. 67 With property rights, the incentives faced by 
fishing fleets are aligned with the long-term sustainability of 
the underlying resource. As conservation scholar R.J. Smith 
explains: 
Wherever we have exclusive private ownership, whether it 
is organized around a profit-seeking or nonprofit 
undertaking, there are incentives for the private owners to 
preserve the resource. . . . [P]rivate ownership allows the 
owner to capture the full capital value of the resource, and 
self-interest and economic incentive drive the owner to 
maintain its long-term capital value.68 
For incentives to work, the property right to a resource must 
be definable, defendable, and divestible. Where property rights 
are insecure, owners are less likely to invest in improving or 
protecting a resource. In many tropical nations, for example, 
the lack of secure property rights encourages deforestation as 
there is no incentive to maintain forest land, let alone invest in 
replanting. 69 Where existing environmental regulations 
undermine the security of property rights, they discourage 
conservation. The foremost example of this is the ESA, which 
effectively punishes private landowners for owning habitat of 
endangered species by restricting land-use. As Sam Hamilton, 
former Fish and Wildlife Service administrator for the State of 
Texas, noted, "The incentives are wrong here. If I have a rare 
metal on my property, its value goes up. But if a rare bird 
65. See id. at 31-35. 
66. Hardin, supra note 63, at 1243. 
67. See DE ALESSI, supra note 64, at 68-74. 
68. Robert J. Smith, Resolving the Tragedy of the Commons by Creating Private 
Property Rights in Wildlife, 1 CATO J. 439, 456 (1981). 
69. See Roger A. Sedjo, Forests: Conflicting Signals, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE 
PLANET 177, 204 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995) [hereinafter TRUE STATE]. 
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occupies the land, its value disappears."70 This economic reality 
creates a powerful incentive for landowners to destroy present or 
potential habitat on private land. Thus, in North Carolina, timber 
owners are dramatically shortening their cutting rotations and 
cutting trees at a much younger age- at significant economic 
cost- so as to avoid regulatory proscriptions that could force 
them to lose their investments altogether.71 
To maximize the incentives for long-term sustainability, 
owners must also be free to transfer their property rights to 
others. Where rights are transferable, even someone indifferent 
or hostile to environmental protection has an incentive to take 
environmental concerns into account, because despoiling the 
resource may reduce its value in the eyes of potential buyers. 
Cars and homes that are privately owned are cared for better 
than those that are rented. The role of government is to protect 
property rights for environmental resources and enforce the 
voluntary agreements property owners contract to carry out. 
The creation of secure property rights necessarily entails 
protecting property from private harm, such as that caused by 
pollution. This is inherent in the idea of property. "Property 
rights govern who has the right to use the environment in 
which ways, and who has the duty to respect others' rights."72 
To harm someone's property by polluting it is no more 
acceptable than to harm that property by vandalizing it. Thus 
landowners used common law doctrines of nuisance and 
trespass to defend against pollution for many years.73 While 
70. Betsy Carpenter, The Best-Laid Plans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., October 4, 
1993, at 89. 
71. See Lueck, supra note 14, at 107·10. 
72. ELIZABETH BRUBAKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE DEFENCE OF NATURE 18 
(1995). 
73. See id. See generally CTR. PRIVATE CONSERVATION, THE COMMON LAW 
APPROACH TO POLLUTION PREVENTION: A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION (1998); THE 
COMMON LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RETHINKING THE STATUTORY BASIS FOR 
MODERN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morris eds., 2000) 
[hereinafter COMMON LAW AND ENVIRONMENT]; YANDLE, supra note 60; Meiners 
& Yandle, Clean Water Legislation: Reauthorize or Repeal?, in TAKING THE 
ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY, supra note 22, at 88-93; Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, 
Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
923 (1999); Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law Environmentalism, 94 PUB. 
CHOICE 99 (1998); Roger E. Meiners, Elements of Property Rights: The Common Law 
Alternative, in LAND RIGHTS: THE 1990s' PROPERTY RIGHTS REBELLION (Bruce 
Yandle ed., 1995); Todd J. Zywicki, A Unanimity-Reinforcing Model of Efficiency in the 
Common Law: An Institutional Comparison of Common Law and Legislative Solutions to 
Large Number Externality Problems,46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 961 (1996). 
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common law principles no longer form the basis of pollution 
control efforts in the United States, these doctrines still provide 
robust protection for water quality in rivers and streams in 
parts of England.74 For property rights to serve environmental 
goals, it is essential to apply common-law-style liability rules to 
pollution problems?5 
Whether a free market paradigm for environmental 
protection is better or worse than the "market failure" 
paradigm is an empirical question;76 "the real comparison one 
must make in contemplating a regulatory intervention is that 
between an admittedly imperfect market and what will 
inevitably be imperfect regulation."77 While reliance upon 
market institutions will not lead to ecological paradise, the 
empirical evidence shows quite dearly that ecological concerns 
are better cared for when incorporated into market institutions 
through property rights and exchange than left dependent 
upon government beneficence for protection. 
If private markets were a greater threat to environmental 
protection, one would expect government agencies to do a 
better job at protecting environmental values than private 
actors. Indeed one might even expect environmental quality to 
correlate with government intervention in the economy. Yet the 
opposite is the case. Private ownership of ecological resources, 
for all its faults, outperforms political management. While 
some critics charge that private owners are short-sighted, , 
private firms devote significantly greater resources to 
maintaining the value of their capital stock.78 The more political 
institutions seek to replicate the incentive structures inherent in 
private ownership, the more reliable and responsible ecological 
74. See Roger Bate, Protecting English and Welsh Rivers: The Role of the Anglers' 
Conservation Association, in COMMON LAW AND ENVIRONMENT, supra note 73, at 86-
87. 
75. For a discussion of how common law rules can be used to protect property 
rights in environmental resources, see Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen 
Suits, Standing and Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F., at Part 
IV (forthcoming 2001). 
76. It can also be seen as an ethical question. See Paul Heyne, Economics, Ethics, 
and Ecology, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY, supra note 22, at 25-47. 
77. Paul R. Portney, EPA and the Evolution of Federal Regulation, in PUBLIC 
POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 16 (Paul R. Portney & Robert N. 
Stavins eds., 2d ed. 2000). 
78. See Richard L. Stroup & Sandra L. Goodman, Property Rights, Environmental 
Resources, and the Future, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 427, 440-43 (1992) 
(comparing public and private mass transit services). 
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management becomes. 
While the U.S. is the world's greatest timber producer, it is 
also experiencing tremendous forest regrowth. 79 Each of the six 
national timber inventories conducted between 1952 and 1991 
found greater forest volume than the one before.80 The lion's 
share of this regeneration is occurring on private land.81 Private 
timberlands account for approximately eighty-five percent of 
total tree planting and seeding.82 Some timber companies also 
make investments in wildlife management and recreation to 
generate income in the decades between cutting rotations.83 
Private timberlands are not perfect, of course. Yet they compare 
quite favorably with their politically managed counterparts. 
The federal government owns approximately one-third of 
the United States84 -one of every three acres-and much of it is 
the worse for wear. Forest Service analysts warned for years of 
the impending buildup of fuel in the national forests, yet 
nothing was done. The record-setting wildfires throughout the 
western United States in 2000 were the inevitable result of this 
mismanagement.85 The forests are not the only lands being 
neglected, though. The National Park Service faces a 
maintenance backlog in excess of $12 billion.86 Improper 
wildlife management in Yellowstone and Rocky Mountain 
National Parks has led to overgrazing, increasing risks to 
biodiversity.87 Yet a lack of resources is not the problem. 
Federal land management expenditures, measured in dollars 
per acre, have more than tripled since 1962.88 
79. See Sedjo, supra note 69, at 189-90. 
80. See id. at 185. 
81. See Jonathan H. Adler, Poplar Front: The Rebirth of America's Forests, in 
ECOLOGY, LIBERTY & PROPERTY 65, 72 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2000) (citing U.S. 
Forest Service report that found increasing timber volume for all ownerships save 
national forests). 
82. See Sedjo, supra note 69, at 203. 
83. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, ENVIRO-CAPITALISTS: DOING 
GOOD WHILE DOING WELL 4-8 (1997). 
84. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 240 
(1999). 
85. See Robert H. Nelson, Fires by Design, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2000, at A25; see 
also ROBERT NELSON, A BURNING ISSUE: A CASE FOR ABOLISHING THE U.S. FOREST 
SERVICE (2000). 
86. GAO, National Park Service: Efforts to IdentifY and Manage the Maintenance 
Backlog, GAO/RCED-98-143, May 1998, at 3. 
87. See HOLLY LIPPKE FRETWELL, PUBLIC LANDS-FEDERAL ESTATE: IS BIGGER 
BETTER? 6 (2000). 
88. See id. at 5. 
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Federal land mismanagement is instead the inevitable result 
of political control of environmental resources and the 
incentives such control creates. Even the most professional 
natural resource specialists employed by federal agencies are 
limited by the political nature of managing federally-owned 
lands. Private owners- whether corporations or non-profit 
land trusts- bear the costs of poor management decisions and 
have strong incentives to maintain their property. Yet as noted 
above, managers of federal lands face no such incentives. 89 
Whereas private owners view maintenance expenditures and 
the like as investments in existing assets, government entities 
"treat all maintenance expenditures as current operating 
expenses that must be financed through current revenues."90 
The incentives faced by government agencies are simply not 
conducive to sound resource management. 
Corporations large and small are subject to substantial fines. 
Executives and managers face jail time for environmental 
violations.91 Federal officials, on the other hand, face no such 
risks. While federal facilities are generally supposed to meet 
the same environmental requirements, enforcement and 
compliance are spotty. One in four federal facilities were out of 
compliance with the applicable clean water standards in 1996, a 
higher rate than for equivalent facilities in the private sector.92 
Yellowstone National Park is supposed to be one of the crown 
jewels in the National Park System. Yet in 1998 and 1999 park 
officials allowed tens of thousands of gallons of raw sewage to 
flow untreated into local waterways.93 
The comparison between private and political ecological 
performance is most stark when one considers the ecological 
legacy of the former Soviet nations. These nations were not 
without their environmental laws, but state control of the 
89. See NELSON, supra note 46 (providing a more thorough critique of federal 
land management, and the failure of "scientific management" on federal lands); 
see also FRETWELL, supra note 87 (same). 
90. Stroup & Goodman, supra note 78, at 439. 
91. Even relatively minor environmental violations can land an individual in 
jail. See, e.g., John D. Copeland, The Criminalization of Environmental Law: The 
Implications for Agriculture, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 237, 267-68 (1995) (recounting the 
prosecution and conviction of Bill Ellen and others for relatively minor wetland 
violations). 
92. See David Armstrong, The Nation's Dirty, Big Secret, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14, 
1999, at A1 (reporting results of an EPA Inspector General investigation). 
93. See id. 
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economy was also an ecological disaster. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall revealed toxic pollution far in excess of anything that had 
been imagined. Our worst ecological nightmares were the 
Soviet nations' environmental reality. In 1988 a single Ukranian 
city, Zaporozhe, released toxic emissions equivalent to 
approximately one-third of all American emissions at the 
time. 94 Potable drinking water was scarce and Soviet forests 
were decimated.95 In just under thirty years, the Aral Sea was 
drained by 66 percent to subsidize irrigation, and fish 
populations were decimated.96 The lack of private ownership 
left no one with any incentive to care about preserving 
ecological values. 
Socialist systems are also worse for environmental protection 
because they sacrifice the natural ecological benefits of market-
driven efficiency gains. In the simplest of terms, market 
competition creates tremendous pressure to minimize costs, 
and that means finding ways of doing more with less-
producing more widgets with less material and energy. Over 
time, market economies produce a continued decline in the 
energy and material inputs necessary for a unit of industrial 
output. This can be seen in the replacement of copper with 
fiber optics (made from silica - i.e., sand), the downsizing of 
computer circuitry, the light weighting of packaging/ the 
explosion of agricultural productivity, and so on.97 Less 
material is used and disposed of, reducing overall 
environmental impacts from productive activity. This same 
trend is rarely evident in socialist economies where, on 
average, it took nearly three times as much energy to produce a 
given unit of goods or services.98 Almost the same ratio existed 
94. See PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & KAREN LAFOLLETTE, MELTDOWN: INSIDE THE 
SOVIET ECONOMY 32 (1990). 
95. See id. at 34-35. 
96. See Richard L. Stroup & Jane S. Shaw, Environmental Harms from Federal 
Government Policy, in TAKING THE ENVIRONMENT SERIOUSLY, supra note 22, at 52. 
For more on the horrific Soviet environmental legacy, see MURRAY FESHBACH & 
ALFRED FRIENDLY, JR., ECOCIDE IN THE USSR: HEALTH AND NATION UNDER SIEGE 
(1991). 
97. See generally Lynn Scarlett, Doing More with Less: Dematerialization-Unsung 
Environmental Triumph, in EARTH REPORT2000: REVISTING THE TRUE STATE OF THE 
PLANET (Ronald Bailey ed., 1999); Indur M. Goklany, Richer Is More Resilient: 
Dealing with Climate Change and More Urgent Environmental Problems, in EARTH 
REPORT 2000: REVISTING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET (Ronald Bailey ed., 1999). 
98. See MIKHAIL BERNSTAM, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
24 (1991). 
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for steel.99 The key to such improvements is a system of well-
defined and enforced property rights. International studies of 
economic and environmental trends demonstrate that 
"environmental quality and economic growth rates are greater 
in regimes where property rights are well defined than in 
regimes where property rights are poorly defined."100 
Indeed, the record of the past century should conclusively 
demonstrate that incorporating resources into the marketplace 
through the creation and protection of property rights is the 
surest means of replacing shortages with ample supply, and 
encouraging sustainable development.101 As one looks around 
the world at which resources are protected and which 'are 
imperiled, a clear pattern emerges. Tropical forests, largely 
owned by governments or left as unowned commons, are in 
decline; temperate forests, predominantly in wealthy countries 
and often privately owned, are stable and expanding.102 Fish 
stocks in the open oceans are declining, while aquaculture 
booms and fisheries with quasi-property rights in New 
Zealand and elsewhere maintain sustainable catches.103 
Proven reserves of copper, iron, bauxite, and oil, among 
many other resources, have skyrocketed over the past several 
decades.104 Prices for all these minerals- the surest measure of 
scarcity- have also declined. Indeed, the near-universal trend 
for natural resources managed primarily through market 
institutions is one of less scarcity and greater abundance.105 
99. See id. 
100. Seth W. Norton, Property Rights, the Environment and Economic Well-Being, in 
WHO OWNS THE ENVIRONMENT? 37, 51 (Peter J. Hill & Roger E. Meiners eds., 
1998); see also DON COURSEY & CHRISTOPHER HARTWELL, ENVIRONMENTAL AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH OUTCOMES: AN INTERNATIONAL AND HISTORICAL COMPARISON 
(Irving B. Harris Sch. Pub. Policy Studies, Working Paper No. 00.10, 2000), abstract 
available at http:/ fwww.harrisschool.uchicago.edu/wpjwp_00-10.html (finding 
that, across the board, greater government regulation of private activity correlates 
with higher levels of emissions and poorer public health indicators). 
101. See generally Jerry Taylor, The Challenge of Sustainable Development, REG., 
Winter 1994, at 35. 
102. See Sedjo, supra note 69, at 179. 
103. See Michael De Alessi, Fishingfor Solutions: The State of the World's Fisheries, 
in EARTH REPORT 2000: REVISTING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 86 (Ronald 
Bailey ed., 1999); Kent Jeffreys, Rescuing the Oceans, in TRUE STATE, supra note 69, at 
295,309. 
104. See Taylor, supra note 101, at 37-38; see also Stephen Moore, The Coming Age 
of Abundance, in TRUE STATE, supra note 69, at 109, 115-16. 
105. See Taylor supra note 101, at 37-38; see also Stephen Moore, The Coming Age 
of Abundance, in TRUE STATE supra note 69, at 109. 
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Much the same can be said of agriculture in nations where 
farmers own the land and reap the benefits of their own hard 
work and investment.106 From 1961 to 1994, per capita food 
production increased nearly twenty percent and per capita 
agriculture production increased nearly as much.107 
The environmental defense of the marketplace is not a 
defense of the status quo. Despite the dramatic gains of the past 
several decades, vast room for improvement remains. 
Environmental protection is an important societal goal, but it 
will not be achieved if existing policies and institutional 
arrangements are left in place. The ecological agenda of the 
next several years should focus on the creative extension of 
market institutions and the removal of government 
interventions that distort market transactions and obstruct the 
development of private solutions to environmental concerns. 
IV. PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM 
Reforming environmental policy will not be easy; policy 
revolutions are not made overnight. Adhering to a set of 
principles can guide reform efforts and avoid some of the 
pitfalls and cul .. de-sacs that can derail promising policy 
changes. In the environmental context, these principles should 
seek to reduce government interventions that distort economic 
and environmental dedsionmaking or subsidize environmental 
harm, promote technological development and wealth creation, 
develop and expand property rights in environmental 
resources, hold private actors accountable for the 
106. This is not always true in the United States due to extensive farm subsidies 
that depress production. However, the United States's market economy is a 
tremendous driver of technological advance, which helps increase per-acre food 
yields. 
107. See Paul Georgia et al., Benchmarks: The Ecological and Economic Trends that 
Are Shaping the Natural Environment and Human Societies, in EARTH REPORT 2000: 
REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET 260-61, 256-57 (Ronald Bailey ed., 
1999). 
This has tremendous ecological benefits as increases in agricultural productivity 
reduce the stress that rising global population and food demand otherwise place 
on habitat and undeveloped lands. Had agricultural productivity not improved 
since the 1960s, producing the amount of food the world demands today would 
require nearly twice the amount of cropland. See Jonathan H. Adler, Biosafe or 
Biosorry?, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL L. REV. 761 (2000) (discussing importance of 
technological advance and increased agricultural production to biodiversity 
protection); Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the Precautionary 
Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TX. INT'L L.J. 173, 198-
202 (2000) (same). 
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environmental harms they cause, and foster ecological 
innovation by decentralizing dedsionmaking. Not every 
principle will be applicable in every environmental policy 
context. Yet together they represent a new science of 
environmental protection that can lead to greater 
environmental progress in the years to come. 
A. First, Do No Harm 
Many government programs cause or encourage 
environmental harm. The federal government is far and away 
the nation's largest polluter. Nationwide there are 
approximately 50,000 sites contaminated by the federal 
government. Cleanup will cost an estimated $235-$389 billion, 
according to the General Accounting Office.108 Merely cleaning 
up the lands used for military training and target practice will 
cost tens of billions of dollars.109 In addition, numerous 
programs, including various subsidies for politically favored 
industries, encourage further environmental degradation. 
Subsidized disaster insurance and beach "restoration" 
programs reduce the cost of construction in flood plains and 
fragile coastal zones. Subsidized recreation on federal lands 
leads to overcrowding and ecological decline as sensitive lands,. 
quite literally, are trampled underfoot. 
Environmental problems that result from government 
programs are often themselves the rationale for expansive 
regulatory efforts. Thus, government subsidization of 
environmental harm costs Americans twice: first when they are 
taxed to pay for the programs, and again when they are taxed 
or regulated to address the problem that the government 
helped to create in the first place. Federally funded water 
projects and irrigation subsidies artificially lower water prices, 
producing fears of water shortages in years with low rainfall 
and calls for "efficiency" standards on showers, washing 
machines and toilets.110 The Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers dam and redirect rivers, disrupting 
108. GAO, Federal Facilities: Consistent Relevant Risk Evaluations Needed for 
Prioritizing Cleanups, GAO/RCED-96-150, June 1996, at 29. 
109. According to the Defense Science Board, cleaning five percent of such 
lands would cost an estimated $15 billion. See David Armstrong, Government as 
Polluter: More Costly Cleanup on Horizon, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 14,1999, at A33. 
110. See Ben Lieberman, Potty Politics, WASH. MONTHLY, Oct. 1998, at 30, 31. 
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watersheds, fragmenting habitat, and dislocating species,111 
and in the process fuel calls for greater wetland regulation and 
species recovery efforts.112 By some estimates, "30 percent of 
the loss of forested wetlands in the lower Mississippi Valley 
resulted from private conversions encouraged by federal flood 
control projects."113 
Some congressional leaders are proud of a new multi-billion-
dollar plan to restore the Florida Everglades, but they should 
ask why such a massive restoration effort is required in the first 
place.114 The Corps of Engineers began to remold the Florida 
Everglades in 1948 with disastrous results. Corps-built canals 
facilitated agricultural and residential development, increasing 
runoff and contamination. Species numbers and biodiversity 
dropped dramatically. Everglades destruction was fueled 
further by sugar subsidies that cost consumers an estimated 
$1.4 billion per year.115 Now the Corps is proposing a $7.8 
billion restoration project to undue some of the damage that 
federal policies brought.116 
The single most effective step that the federal government 
could take to advance environmental protection is to adopt an 
environmental Hippocratic Oath to "first, do no harm" to the 
environment. By cleaning up its own act, the government could 
do much to reduce environmental harms. This not only means 
improving the compliance and performance records of 
government agencies and facilities, but also putting an end to 
government programs that encourage environmental 
degradation or wasteful use of resources. The federal budget 
should be scrubbed from top to bottom to eliminate programs 
that generate significant environmental impacts. Even 
111. See, e.g., Michael Grunwald, Engineers of Power; Inside the Army Corps, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 10,2000, at A1 (discussing the environmental legacy of the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers). 
112. It should be noted with some irony that the Corps is also the federal 
agency with primary responsibility for wetland regulation. 
113. PAUL F. SCODARI, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL WETLANDS 
PROGRAMS 16 (1997) (citing Robert N. Stavins & Adam B. Jaffe, Unintended Impacts 
of Public Investments on Private Decisions: The Depletion of Forested Wetlands, 80 AM. 
ECON. REV. 337,349 (1990)). 
114. See Michael Grunwald, In Everglades, a Chance for Redemption, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 14, 2000, at A1. 
115. See GAO, Sugar Program: Changing Domestic and International Conditions 
Require Program Changes, GAO/RCED-93-84, April1993. 
116. See Grunwald, supra note 111. 
No.2] Free & Green 679 
programs that indirectly subsidize excess resource use by 
funding industrial research and development should be 
eliminated. The Energy Information Administration estimates 
that the government grants aggregate energy subsidies of 
between $5 billion and $10 billion per year, approximately $2 
billion of which is devoted to research and development 
programs that benefit particular energy industries.117 
Greenhouse warming may or may not be a problem that 
requires urgent government attention, but it should be clear 
that there is little reason for the federal government to 
subsidize research and development of fossil fuels. 
It is not only the federal budget that needs to be greened in 
this way. Existing tax and regulatory policies can also induce 
environmental damage. Consider the estate tax. This tax is 
levied upon transfers of wealth in any form at the time of death 
at a rate of up to 55 percent. This creates a powerful incentive 
for landowners to subdivide and develop their land, 
particularly in rural areas where landowners may be "land rich 
and cash poor." For them, subdividing or developing inherited 
land is the only way to pay the estate tax. The average annual 
household income for a tree farmer is under $50,000, according 
to the Joint Economic Committee.118 Yet the average tree farm 
has a book value of $2 million or more.119 When a tree farmer 
dies, there is simply no way for his family to pay the estate tax 
without clearing timber or selling off land. For this reason the 
estate tax has accelerated the cutting of timber on private land. 
"If estate taxes were not assessed by the government, 
thousands of acres of privately owned land would be protected 
from development," notes Dennis "Duke" Hammond, a 
biological scientist with the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish 
Commission.120 
117. See Energy Info. Admin., Federal Energy Subsidies: Direct and Indirect 
Interventions in Energy Markets, at x, 6 (Nov. 1992). This study also notes that 
regulations do more to distort energy markets than subsidies at existing levels. See 
id. at x. 
118. See }OINT ECON. COMM., 105TH CONG., THE ECONOMICS OF THE ESTATE TAX 
50 (1998). 
119. See Reducing the Tax Burden: Hearing Before House Comm. on Ways and Means, 
105th Cong. 126 (1998) (statement of Douglas P. Stinson), available at 
http:/ fwaysandmeans.house.gov /fullcomm/105cong/1-28-98/1-28stin.htm. 
120. Dennis E. Hammond, Protecting Panther Habitat on Private Lands in Southern 
Florida-A Current Assessment, in TRANS. 63D NORTH AMERICAN WILDLIFE AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES CONFERENCE 459 (1998). 
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Federal regulations, even environmental regulations, can 
cause environmental harm as well. Detailed rules that dictate 
how companies must meet particular projects leave little room 
for environmental innovation. "Regulations that are overly 
prescriptive can lock in existing technologies to the detriment 
of other technologies that might meet or exceed requirements," 
concluded the Office of Technology Assessment in a 1995 
report.121 The Environmental Law Institute reached similar 
conclusions in a recent study: "Technology-based emission 
limits and discharge standards, which are embedded in most of 
our pollution laws, play a key role in discouraging 
innovation."122 At the same time, regulations that "grandfather" 
existing facilities can artificially prolong the lives of older, less 
efficient facilities, increasing pollution levels above what they 
would otherwise be. 
In a similar fashion, hazardous waste regulations can 
increase the cost of handling items designated as "hazardous" 
so much that companies are forced to dispose of materials that 
could be profitably recycled or reused. While the EPA would 
like fluorescent bulbs to be recycled because of their mercury 
content, existing regulations push in the opposite direction. As 
the EPA itself acknowledged, "additional costs associated with 
managing, transporting, and disposing of lighting wastes as 
hazardous wastes can create an additional disincentive to join 
Green Lights [a voluntary federal energy-efficiency program] 
and make the initial investment in energy-efficient light 
technologies."123 
Environmental regulations also have the potential to increase 
risks to human health and safety.124 As Justice Breyer (then 
Judge Breyer) observed, "one can find many examples of 
regulators' ignoring one program's safety or environmental 
effects upon another."125 Thus, when the EPA sought to ban the 
121. U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, lNNOV ATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION 
OF EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 87-88 (1995). 
122. !d. at 6. 
123. 59 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (EPA 1994); see also Jonathan H. Adler, Wasted Lights, 
REG., Spring 1996, at 15-18 (citing regulatory disincentives for corporations to 
install more energy efficient lighting). 
124. See generally Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996) (documenting the negative public health 
impacts that often result from environmental regulation). 
125. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
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use of asbestos in brake pads and applications, it ignored the 
fact that likely alternatives posed a greater risk to public 
health.126 In promulgating tighter standards for ground-level 
ozone ("smog"), the EPA ignored data suggesting that reducing 
ground-level ozone could increase human exposure to 
ultraviolet-B radiation and consequently increase skin cancer 
rates.127 Perhaps the most extreme examples of risky 
environmental regulation are federal fuel economy standards 
for automobiles. Designed to conserve energy, these 
regulations result in vehicle downsizing which reduces 
crashworthiness. The result, according to a Harvard-Brookings 
study, is several thousand additional highway fatalities per 
model year .128 
In all of its activities, the federal government should adopt 
the environmental equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath and 
"first, do no harm." Before the government imposes mandates 
or restrictions on the private sector, it should make sure its own 
house is in order and eliminate environmentally-destructive 
programs.129 In a similar vein, environmental policies aimed at 
reducing risks must not increase other risks in the process. 
B. Green Through Growth 
Economic progress is absolutely essential to environmental 
progress. Environmental protection is a good, and like all 
goods it must be purchased. A healthy economy is necessary to 
finance environmental improvements. While many 
environmental activists perceive a conflict between economic 
growth and environmental progress, the opposite is true. 
REGULATION 22 (1993); see also Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, "More 
Good Than Harm": A First Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 
20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 390 (1993) (noting that "when agencies regulate a particular 
substance or technology, they often fail to consider the secondary impacts of 
regulation, such as the risks presented by substitute products or activities"). 
126. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
127. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 10271 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1999), 
a.ff'd in part, rev'd in part, Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 121 S. Ct. 903 (2001). 
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA's refusal to consider 
the radiation-blocking potential of tropospheric ozone violated the CAA. See id. at 
1051-53. The Supreme Court did not address that issue on review. 
128. See Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, The Effect of Fuel Economy Standards 
on Automobile Safety, 32J.L. & ECON. 97,110 (1989). 
129. It should be noted that the National Environmental Policy Act does 
relatively little in this regard, as it only requires the government to examine and 
report the likely environmental impacts of federal projects. It has no substantive 
requirement that such impacts be reduced. 
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Sewage treatment facilities and other environmental 
improvements are not free. Moreover, a significant body of 
literature has found a correlation between economic 
improvements and several measures of environmental quality. 
Not only are wealthy communities healthier than poor 
communities, but they also tend on average to be more 
concerned about upholding environmental values as well.130 
Wealthier societies have both the means and the desire to 
address a wider array of environmental concerns.131 Economic 
growth fuels technological advance and generates the resources 
necessary to deploy new methods of meeting human needs 
efficiently and effectively. Thus, wealthier societies tend to 
provide for human needs in a more environmentally sound 
manner. "Countries undergo an environmental transition as 
they become wealthier and reach a point at which they start 
getting cleaner."132 This occurs first with particularly acute 
environmental concerns, such as access to safe drinking water 
and sanitation services. As affluence increases, so does the 
attention paid to conventional pollution concerns such as fecal 
coliform bacteria and urban air quality.133 
In much the same way that wealthier societies become 
cleaner, "wealthier is healthier."134 In other words, as income 
increases, mortality and morbidity decline.135 Conversely, 
"when national income falls, there often is a significant increase 
130. See generally RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990) (noting that societies become increasingly preoccupied 
with quality of life issues, such as environmental protection, as they become more 
affluent). 
131. See Norton, supra note 100, at 45 (noting that, insofar as environmental 
quality is viewed as a "good," "consumption" of environmental quality will 
increase as wealth increases). 
132. Indur Goklany, Richer Is Cleaner, in TRUE STATE, supra note 69, at 339, 341. 
133. Goklany observes that while the "environmental transition" for drinking 
water and sanitation occurs "almost immediately as the level of affluence 
increases above subsistence," the transition appears to occur at approximately 
$1,375 per capita for fecal coliform and $3,280 and $3,670 per capita for urban 
particulate matter and sulfur dioxide concentrations respectively. Id. at 342. For a 
fuller treatment of the correlation between affluence and air quality, see generally 
GOKLANY, supra note 24. 
134. See Aaron Wildavsky, Wealthier Is Healthier, REG., Jan.-Feb. 1980, at 10. For 
a more complete discussion of this phenomenon, see AARON WILDA VSKY, 
SEARCHING FOR SAFETY {1988). 
135. See, e.g., Susan L. Ettner, New Evidence on the Relationship Between Income 
and Health, 15 J. HEALTH ECON., 67 (1996); John D. Graham, Bei-Hung Chang & 
JohnS. Evans, Poorer Is Riskier, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 333, 336 (1992). 
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in mortality and a decline in health status."136 Expenditures on 
regulatory compliance are rarely wealth enhancing, and 
therefore increasing regulatory costs can reduce gains in public 
health.137 As Justice Stephen Breyer observed, "[a]t all times 
regulation imposes costs that mean less real income available to 
individuals for alternative expenditure[, which] itself has 
adverse health effects."138 
Wealthier societies are not only cleaner and healthier; they 
are also more willing and able to devote resources to 
environmental concerns. Public support for environmental 
measures, both public and private, correlates with changes in 
personal income.139 In economic jargon, "[w]illingness to pay 
for environmental measures ... is highly elastic with respect to 
income."140 Thus, it should be no surprise that donors to 
environmental groups tend to have above average annual 
incomes. Members of the Sierra Club, for example, have an 
average household income more than double the U.S. average.141 
In the aggregate, environmental regulation can work against 
continuing environmental progress by diverting tens· of billions 
of dollars, if not more, away from wealth-creating activity. 
Insofar as regulation reduces economic growth by diverting 
investment and human energies away from productivity, it will 
retard environmental progress. While this is true in the U.S., it 
136. Is the Office of Management and Budget Interfering with Workers Health and 
Safety Protection?: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Gov't Affairs, 102d Cong. 43 
(1992) (statement of James B. MacRae, Jr., Acting Administrator and Deputy 
Administrator, Office ·of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of 
Management and Budget). MacRae cited several studies, including a 1984 report 
by Congress's Joint Economic Committee that found that declines in real per 
capita income in the early 1970s led to a corresponding increase in total mortality, 
amounting to as many as 60,000 additional deaths. See id. at 45 (citing JOINT ECON. 
COMM., 981H CONG., ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE ON NATIONAL 
HEAL1H AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING, J842-38 (1984)). 
137. See generally Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of 
Health/Health Analysis, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729 (1995); Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality 
Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 147 (1990). 
138. BREYER, supra note 125, at 23. 
139. This is also generally true for charity in general. See RICHARD B. 
MCKENZIE, WHAT WENT RIGHT IN THE 1980s, at 70 (1994) (noting that "(h]igher 
incomes lead to increased giving"). 
140. Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, Introducton: The Toxic Liability 
Problem: Why Is It Too Large?, in CUffiNG GREEN TAPE: TOXIC POLLUTANTS, 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND 1HE LAW 15 (Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. 
Meiners eds., 2000). 
141. See id. (citing 1992 reader survey for Sierra magazine). 
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is especially true in the poorest of nations.142 Therefore, 
environmental policy makers must always be conscious of the 
costs of environmental measures, as increased compliance costs 
can come at the expense of environmental improvement. 
C. Promote and Protect Private Property 
America has a proud conservation tradition demonstrating 
that private owners serving as land and resource managers, 
whether individuals, corporations, or environmental groups, 
are superior to political entities. Rather than expanding 
government ownership and regulation of threatened ecological 
resources, policy makers should seek creative ways of 
expanding property-based institutions into the ecological 
realm. 
As noted above, the creation of property interests empowers 
owners to act as stewards of environmental resources and 
facilitates conservation efforts in the private sector. Whereas 
public or politically managed lands often suffer, "private 
owners have the ability to protect their lands from over use 
[sic]."143 The security of property rights encourages owners to 
pursue the enhancement of their own subjective value 
preferences, including both commercial and non-commercial 
values. Property rights enable timber companies to protect their 
investment in planting trees or enhancing forest growth, but they 
also protect the investments made by conservation groups in 
ecological protection and restoration. "Private ownership 
includes not only hunting preserves, commercial bird breeders, 
parrot jungles, and safari parks, it also includes wildlife 
sanctuaries, Audubon Society refuges, World Wildlife Fund 
preserves, and a multitude of private, non-profit conservation 
and preservation projects."144 These organizations raise money 
by soliciting contributions to acquire ownership in preferred 
lands. 
Whereas political conservation often generates a zero-sum 
142. Goklany, supra note 132, at 370 ("[A]nything that unduly retards economic 
growth in developing countries- including inefficient policies, no matter how 
well intentioned- will ultimately retard net environmental progress and imperil 
human lives."). 
143. Council on Environmental Quality, Special Report: The Public Benefits of 
Private Conservation, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 1984, at 363, 367 (1984). 
144. Smith, supra note 68, at 456. 
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game in which only the most popular initiatives receive funding, 
private property empowers forward-looking conservationists to 
pursue unpopular ecological causes. At the turn of the last 
century, groups such as the National Audubon Society were able 
to use private property to protect threatened species habitat at a 
time when there was no political support for government 
action.145 Similarly, at a time when governments and private 
organizations encouraged the slaughter of raptors, one woman, 
Ms. Rosalie Edge, was able to purchase Hawk Mountain to 
protect birds cof prey from extirpation. While unpopular at the 
time, Ms. Edge's purchase created one of the most important 
raptor research sites in the world.146 In a similar fashion, a 
handful of individuals saved the bison from extinction on the 
western plains at a time when the federal government was 
subsidizing its slaughter.147 Were it not for these efforts, it is 
unlikely that there would be any buffalo in Yellowstone National 
Park today. 
Property rights need not be individuated to serve 
environmental goals. Collective entities, from conservation 
groups to condominium associations, play an important role in 
conservation. Additionally, the recognition of conservation 
easements already empowers conservation groups to purchase 
development rights from a given parcel of land and protect the 
present ecological values.148 There is no single property 
arrangement that is appropriate for every resource, but this 
does not mean that the institution of property ownership can 
be disregarded in conservation efforts. 
Time and again, the greatest conservation successes occur 
when environmental resources are rescued from the tragedy of 
the commons through the creation of property rights. British 
Columbia, for example, the halibut fishery was saved from ruin 
by the introduction of private fishing rights. This change not 
145. See JONATHAN H. ADLER, ENVIRONMENTALISM AT THE CROSSROADS 2-3 
(1995). 
146. See Robert J. Smith, Private Conservation Case Studies: Hawk Mountain 
Sanctuary Association (Apr. 1, 1999), available at http:/ fwww.cei.org; see also 
Council on Environmental Quality, supra note 143, at 387-94. 
147. See Ike C. Sugg, Where the Buffalo Roam, and Why, EXOTIC WILDLIFE, 
Jan/Feb. 1999 ("Bison were initially saved by six individuals who either saw 
business oppprtunities in the existence of bison or simply wanted to save a 
vanishing species." (quoting Dr. Valerius Geist)). 
148. See STEPHEN EAGLE, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS AND PRIVATE LAND 
STEWARDSHIP (1997) (discussing the use of conservation easements). 
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only led to sustainable catch levels but also increased the 
quality of the fish caught and the profitability of local fishing 
operations.149 The creation of private property rights advanced 
conservation where regulation failed. Iceland and New 
Zealand experienced similar success with the implementation 
of a property-regime known as individual transferable 
quotas.150 In a similar fashion, allowing the commercial 
utilization and quasi-ownership of elephants in Zimbabwe has 
led to larger herds and the devotion of greater acreage to 
wildlife habitat.151 This not only benefits elephants, but also 
other, less-marketable species which require similar habitat. 
In some cases, private property rights exist, but they are too 
narrow to allow for private conservation efforts. For decades, 
many western states only recognized property rights in water 
that was used for irrigation, drinking, or another productive 
use. Leaving instream water flows to enhance fish habitat was 
not deemed a productive use and could not be advanced 
through private markef transactions. Over time, however, 
states such as Oregon have begun to recognize property rights 
in instream flows to varying degrees.152 Today, local 
environmental groups such as the Oregon Water Trust 
purchase instream flows from farmers to improve salmon 
habitat.153 This approach can be more cost-effective, and 
certainly less contentious, than pushing to tighten regulatory 
restrictions on water use. This institutional change has 
facilitated greater conservation by expanding the definition of 
property rights to encompass environmental values. 
Dr. Robert Nelson, who served in the Interior Department 
for nearly two decades, has a similar proposal for the 
149. See R. Quentin Grafton et al., Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A 
Study of a Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. & ECON. 679 (2000). 
150. The Icelandic experience is chronicled in HANNES H. GISSURARSON, 
OVERFISHING: THE ICELANDIC SOLUTION (lEt\ Studies Env't No. 17, 2000); See also 
DE ALESSI, supra note64, at41-43. 
151. IKE SUGG AND URS KREUTER, ELEPHANTS AND IVORY: LESSONS FROM THE 
TRADE BAN 16, 51-53 (lEA Environment Unit 1994); see also Randy T. Simmons & 
Urs P. Kreuter, Herd Mentality, 50 POL'Y REV. 46 (1989). 
152. See TERRY L. ANDERSON & PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING 
THE INVISIBLE PUMP 111-32 (1997). 
153. See ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 83, at 94-95. For an in-depth discussion 
of the Oregon Water Trust, see Erin Schiller, Private Conservation Case Studies: 
The Oregon Water Trust (Nov. 1, 1998), available at http:/ /www.cei.org/ 
CPCCase.asp. 
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protection of grazing lands.154 Under current law, federal land 
grazing permits purchased by ranchers may only be used for 
grazing cattle. Additional rules, such as base-property 
ownership requirements, further restrict the marketability of 
grazing permits. As a result, environmental groups that believe 
it is necessary to reduce grazing on federal lands to protect 
habitat or conserve rangeland have little choice but to seek 
tighter regulations or the revocation of permits. Nelson's 
proposal is to transform the grazing permits into forage-access 
rights. Rather than leasing per!JlitS to graze cattle, the federal 
government would instead lease or sell fully transferable 
forage-access rights that could be used for grazing cattle or for 
other uses, from recreation to conservation. Thus, a private 
environmental organization could purchase forage-access 
rights from the government or existing owners and opt to graze 
elk, sponsor recreational use of the land in question, or simply 
retire the permits and do nothing at all. Again, conservation 
can be advanced by moving toward more complete property 
rights in environmental resources. 
D. Make the Polluter Pay 
Making the polluter pay is merely an extension of the 
principle that environmental protection should be focused on 
the protection of property rights. Pollution control, at its heart, 
is about preventing the forcible imposition of a waste or 
emission by one person onto another. Therefore, pollution 
control efforts should focus upon instances where an unwanted 
emission causes actual harm and not on whether a company 
complies with a permit or generates the "right" amount of 
waste. Pollution control efforts should thus be seen as an 
extension and complement to traditional nuisance doctrines 
and their effort to keep pigs out of parlors, so to speak.155 
While the rhetoric of "polluter pays" is often bandied about 
in environmental policy discussions, few environmental 
programs embody this principle. Even enforcement efforts that 
target polluters rarely impose fines or penalties in proportion 
154. See Robert H. Nelson, How To Reform Grazing Policy: Creating Forage Rights 
on Federal Rangelands, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 645 (1997) (outlining the proposal). 
155. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (noting a 
"nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong place, like a pig in the parlor 
instead of the barnyard"). 
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to the actual amount of pollution caused.156 Current 
environmental policy too rarely focuses on harm and too often 
focuses on compliance with byzantine rules and require-
ments.157 Fines are levied not when the property of another is 
contaminated, but when a permit is improperly filed or a 
waste-transport manifest is not completed in line with the 
demands of regulatory officials.158 This is astonishing evidence 
that many pollution-control efforts are misdirected. The proper 
focus of government officials should be identifying and 
prosecuting firms that tangibly threaten human health and 
environmental properties rather than monitoring compliance 
with overly complex and time-consuming permit and 
paperwork requirements. 
Polluters certainly should be held responsible. This requires 
the application of traditional tort law principles, not the 
erection of a sprawling bureaucracy. Liability should be based 
upon the intrusion of one party into the property of another, 
not on the violation of a bureaucratic proscription on how to 
transport a substance or submit paperwork. Restitution should 
be paid to those harmed, not simply to a government agency 
that proclaims it will spend the money in the public interest. 
Unfortunately, the ability of private parties to restrain 
upstream polluters is limited in the United States today. In 
some cases, traditional common law approaches have been 
completely preempted by federal environmental laws.159 An 
important environmental reform would be to end this form of 
preemption while, at the same time, requiring a demonstration 
of harm in the prosecution of environmental violators. This is 
particularly important in the context of citizen suits, through 
which private individuals and groups enforce existing 
environmental laws. Without a substantive harm requirement 
and clear property interests in underlying resources, there is 
156. See Adler, supra note 51, at 40-48. 
157. Indeed, in a recent survey of corporate counsels, only 30 percent believed it 
was even possible for their firms to achieve full compliance with applicable state 
and federal environmental requirements. See Marianne Lavelle, Environmental 
Vise: Law, Compliance, NAT'L L.J., August 30, 1993, at 51. 
158. For instance, under the Clean Water Act, firms that violate permit 
conditions can be fined up to $25,000 per violation, per day. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) 
(2000). No demonstration of measurable environmental harm is necessary for such. 
fines. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
159. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984); Conner v. Aerovox, 
Inc., 730 F.2d 835 (1st Cir. 1984). 
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likely to be excessive enforcement of environmental standards 
that do little if anything to improve environmental quality.160 
Broad technology mandates or permit schemes operate as 
ecological drift nets. Such approaches achieve pollution 
reductions more through their scope than their efficiency, and 
as a result, they tend to produce environmental improvements 
at the expense of innocent individuals who have not 
contributed to the harm. Even when the impacts of water or 
airborne emissions are extremely difficult to control, 
environmental protection and simple justice are better served 
when pollution reduction efforts focus on the true sources of 
pollution and ensure that it is the polluters who pay for the 
damage. 
Consider the case of air pollution. It is well-established that a 
small fraction of automobiles are responsible for the vast 
preponderance of auto-related emissions. Indeed, half of the 
emissions in California are generated by only ten percent of the 
cars on the road.161 This means that for every ten cars, the 
dirtiest one pollutes as much as the other nine. Nonetheless, 
federal officials insist upon imposing significant costs on the 
owners of all cars through "clean fuel" requirements, periodic 
emission~inspections, and similar regulations in order to meet 
federal air quality standards. If emission reductions are 
necessary in some regions to protect human health (a debatable 
proposition), targeting the dirtiest portion of the automobile 
fleet will reduce pollution more efficiently and more equitably. 
The majority of car owners whose vehicles are in dean-running 
condition should not be forced to pay for the pollution caused 
by an irresponsible minority. (Additionally, it is questionable 
whether the federal government should tell local communities 
what level of air emissions is acceptable.) 
Making the polluter pay should not entail trying to eliminate 
the generation of wastes and byproducts of a modern, 
industrial society, nor does it mean regulating every emission, 
every industrial process, indeed every aspect of economic life. 
Making the polluter pay means focusing environmental 
160. See generally Adler, supra note 75 (setting out argument more fully). 
161. See DONALD STEDMAN ET AL., ON-ROAD REMOTE SENSING OF CO AND HC 
EMISSIONS IN CALIFORNIA 13 (Cal. Air Res. Bd. 1994); J.G. Calvert et al., Achieving 
Acceptable Air Quality: Some Reflections on Controlling Vehicle Emission, SCI., July 2, 
1993, at 40. 
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protection efforts on the greatest sources of harm and ensuring 
that polluters pay for the costs of the harms they inflict upon 
others. 
E. Decentralize Decisionmaking 
Although not every environmental problem will be solved 
by removing government subsidies and not every 
environmental concern is immediately amenable to the creation 
of property rights, these are not excuses for maintaining the 
status quo. Few if any environmental problems are national in 
scope. Most are local or regional in nature. Therefore, few 
environmental concerns require a national solution. Most 
environmental concerns would be best handled at the level at 
which the problem occurs. Wherever possible, policymakers 
should decentralize environmental decisionmaking by 
returning more power and authority to state and local 
governments. Where problems have the potential to generate 
substantial interstate externalities, the federal government 
should support the development of interstate compacts and 
regional approaches rather than assuming federal regulations 
are the best solution.162 
Even though most environmental problems are local or 
regional, the federal government dominates most 
environmental protection efforts.163 Hazardous waste sites 
impact local communities. Water quality is typically a local or 
regional concern. Even the impact of urban air pollution is 
often confined to a given airshed.164 At the same time, state and 
local governments are showing themselves willing and able to 
address many environmental concerns. "The popular desire for 
a dean environment can be realized with far more common 
sense by returning control of local environmental issues to state 
162. Where such solutions are impracticable, reliance on a "golden rule" for 
resolving interstate externality problems seems advisable. Such an approach is 
outlined in Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 44 DUKE 
L.J. 931 (1997). 
163. Indeed, this has been the source of substantial tension between the federal 
and state governments. See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the 
Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1995) ("So much political power has been 
reallocated to the federal government that, at times, the states could be mistaken 
for vassals of the federal government."). 
164. See Merrill, supra note 162, at 976-78 (noting reasons why "as a general 
matter, transboundary pollution does not present an especially serious form of 
harm relative to other types of multijurisdictional environmental phenomena"). 
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and local government/' according to David Schoenbrod, an 
attorney formerly with the Natural Resources Defense 
Council.165 
Twenty years ago, Richard Stewart noted the "sobering fact 
is that environmental quality involves too many intricate, 
geographically variegated physical and institutional 
interrelations to be dictated from Washington."166 This is even 
more true today as environmental policy is increasingly 
focused on smaller, more complex problems that are tied to 
local conditions. Federalization of environmental law 
inevitably results in "one-size-fits-nobody" regulations. 
"Federal regulators never have been and never will be able to 
acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information 
necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect 
the technical requirements of particular locations and pollution 
sources. "167 
Environmental concerns and potential solutions are not the 
same throughout the United States. To succeed in a given 
locale, environmental policies must be tailored to local 
conditions. State and local officials are apt to have local 
expertise that is, in practice, unobtainable by national 
agencies.168 "The knowledge necessary to administer any air 
pollution control program ... can be found only at the local 
level."169 The relative sources and composition of urban air 
pollution varies from place to place. The nature of air pollution 
concerns in Phoenix, Arizona, differs from that in Atlanta, 
Georgia.170 Much the same can be said for most pollution 
control issues.171 
165. David Schoenbrod, Time for the Federal Aristocracy to Give Up Power, in 
POLICY STUDY No. 144, at 2 (Center for the Study of American Business 1998). 
166. Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 
1266 (1977). 
167. HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (American Enterprise Institute 1996). 
168. This is essentially Hayek's argument about the impossibility of centralizing 
information. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 1 
(1945). Of course, Hayek· might be skeptical about the ability to centralize 
information at the state level as well. Nonetheless, Hayek supported federalist 
systems. See F.A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 255-72 (1996). 
169. Dwyer, supra note 163, at 1218. 
170. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RETHINKING THE OZONE PROBLEM IN 
URBAN AND REGIONAL AIR POLLUTION 351 {1991). 
171. For example, soil composition and hydrology will affect the likelihood of 
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When policies are nationalized, on the other hand, it can 
become difficult to address the concerns of those communities 
that suffer disproportionately from policy errors or omissions. 
Local environmental concerns must compete against national 
political priorities. A small town that needs to devote resources 
to improving the quality of its drinking water must compete for 
federal funds and attention with whatever environmental 
concern is on the evening news.172 Federal age:t;lCies and 
national politicians are less responsive to local needs than more 
local institutions and officials. As former Illinois EPA chief 
Mary Gade explains, "States are closest to their constituents 
and problems, bringing a necessary sensitivity and perspective 
to local environmental issues that even EPA's 10 regional 
offices, often many hundreds of miles away, can't have."173 
Allowing local or regional control over regulation of 
environmental problems can promote healthy 
interjurisdictional competition for the best environmental 
policies. 174 Allowing the states to operate as green "laboratories 
of democracy"175 can produce both economic and 
environmental gains. Both the theoretical and empirical 
evidence demonstrate that "the possibility of competition will 
lead inexorably to experimentation and product 
differentiation," and this, in turn, produces "innovation and 
improvement."176 
groundwater contamination from runoff or waste disposal; population density 
and topography will affect the likely public health impact of industrial accidents; 
weather patterns, such as the frequency of inversions, will affect ambient 
concentrations of air pollutants; and so on. 
172. See Keith Schneider, How a Rebellion over Environmental Rules Grew from a 
Patch of Weeds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1993, at A16 (quoting observation of 
Columbus, Ohio health official that "the new rules coming out of Washington are 
taking money from decent programs and making me waste them on less 
important problems"). 
173. Mary Gade, When the States Come Marching In, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, 
Winter 1996, at 4. 
174. See generally Adler, supra note 25, at 625-32; Jonathan H. Adler, A New 
Environmental Federalism, in FORUM FOR APPLIED RESEARCH AND PUBLIC POLICY 
(1998); David L. Markell, States As Innovators: It's Time for a New Look at Our 
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Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347 (1994); ALEXANDER VOLOKH ET AL., RACE TO THE 
TOP: THE INNOVATIVE FACE OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (Reason 
Pub. Policy Inst., Policy Study No. 239, 1998). 
175. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
176. Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In 
Defense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752,777 (1995). 
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Forty states have their own hazardous waste cleanup 
program, many of which put the federal Superfund program to 
shame by spending substantially less money than the federal 
government.177 It typically costs $25-30 million to clean up a 
single site in the federal Superfund program, and the average 
cleanup time is about ten years. By comparison, Minnesota is 
cleaning up sites for less than $5 million each and completing 
cleanups in only a few years.178 Brownfield redevelopment 
programs are talked about in Washington, D.C., but they are 
actually happening at the state level.179 Concerned that 
environmental enforcement efforts are inordinately focused on 
measures of "inputs," rather than tangible environmental 
results, two dozen states have passed environmental audit 
privilege laws since 1993.180 These laws reduce penalties for 
companies that voluntarily disclose and correct environmental 
violations, leading to the greater disclosure and cleanup of 
pollution problems. New Jersey may have more costly 
regulations than most states, but it was also the first state to 
statutorily authorize multimedia environmental permits.181 
This approach to permits increases the operational flexibility 
afforded to regulated firms, and it consolidates reporting and 
paperwork requirements while facilitating more accurate 
emission inventories and reducing cross-media transfers of 
pollutants.182 
The benefits of greater state and local control over 
environmental decisionmaking can be seen in the land 
management context as well. State wetland protection efforts 
preceded federal regulation by over a decade, and state 
programs are regularly developing new means of conserving 
and restoring wetlands while the federal program remains 
mired in controversy.183 National forests lose money on timber 
177. See J. WINSTON PORTER, CLEANING UP SUPERFUND: THE CASE FOR STATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP 5 (Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy Study No. 195, 
1995). 
178. See id. 
179. See generally GATTUSO, supra note 6. 
180. See Adler, supra note 51, at 45. 
181. See Jeanne Herb, Success and the Single Permit, ENVTL. FORUM, Nov./Dec. 
1997, at 17. 
182. See id. at 18. 
183. See Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Wateifowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: 
Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 
ENVTL. L. 1, 47-54 (1999) (discussing the history and performance of state wetland 
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sales and have a poor record of environmental protection; state 
forests, such as those in Montana, turn a profit from timber 
management and have superior environmental performance.184 
States such as Texas and New Hampshire have taken steps to 
make their parks self-sufficient while improving the services 
offered to local residents.185 
This is not to say that no state will ever enact bad 
environmental policy. States do and will continue to adopt 
short-sighted policies in the environmental arena as in every 
other area of public policy. It is also possible for states to 
overregulate environmental matters.186 The question should be 
whether the decentralization of environmental policy-making, 
viewed in the aggregate, is likely to improve environmental 
protection. Given the stagnation of environmental reform 
efforts at the federal level and the tremendous burst of 
environmental innovation in many states, encouraging 
environmental devolution is anything but anti-environmental. 
Experimentation is necessary to develop the next generation of 
environmental measures, and it will be more productive to 
have fifty sets of experiments than to rely on only one. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The case for comprehensive environmental reform is clear. 
Current environmental laws frustrate the development of 
cleaner technologies, penalize landowners for owning habitat, 
and fail to address the most significant environmental risks. 
Those institutions upon which free and prosperous societies 
are built- private property, voluntary exchange, freedom of 
contract, and the rule of law- will better provide for the 
protection of public health and ecological values. Such 
approaches may not be perfect, but they hold more promise 
than conventional strategies for environmental protection. It is 
important to give them that chance. 
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